Social groups can be remarkably smart and knowledgeable when their averaged judgements are compared with the judgements of individuals. Already Galton Nature 75:7] found evidence that the median estimate of a group can be more accurate than estimates of experts. This wisdom of crowd effect was recently supported by examples from stock markets, political elections, and quiz shows [Surowiecki J (2004) The Wisdom of Crowds]. In contrast, we demonstrate by experimental evidence (N = 144) that even mild social influence can undermine the wisdom of crowd effect in simple estimation tasks. In the experiment, subjects could reconsider their response to factual questions after having received average or full information of the responses of other subjects. We compare subjects' convergence of estimates and improvements in accuracy over five consecutive estimation periods with a control condition, in which no information about others' responses was provided. Although groups are initially "wise," knowledge about estimates of others narrows the diversity of opinions to such an extent that it undermines the wisdom of crowd effect in three different ways. The "social influence effect" diminishes the diversity of the crowd without improvements of its collective error. The "range reduction effect" moves the position of the truth to peripheral regions of the range of estimates so that the crowd becomes less reliable in providing expertise for external observers. The "confidence effect" boosts individuals' confidence after convergence of their estimates despite lack of improved accuracy. Examples of the revealed mechanism range from misled elites to the recent global financial crisis.
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collective judgment | estimate aggregation | experimental social science | swarm intelligence | overconfidence U nder the right circumstances, the average of many individuals' estimates can be surprisingly close to the truth, although their separate values lie remarkably far from it. There is evidence from guessing tasks (1) and problem-solving experiments (2) (3) (4) that the aggregate of many people's estimates tends to be closer to the true value than all of the separate individual or even expert guesses. This phenomenon is referred to as the "wisdom of crowd effect" (5) . Even individuals can apply this mechanism and improve their decisions by averaging multiple perspectives from their own reasoning (6) (7) (8) .
In the following, we will call an aggregate measure of a collection of individual estimates "wise" if it comes close to the true value, even though the individual estimates are largely dispersed. In this case, single estimates are likely to lie far away from the truth, whereas its aggregate lies close to it. The wisdom of crowds effect works if estimation errors of individuals are large but unbiased such that they cancel each other out. Thus, the heterogeneity of numerous decision-makers generates a more accurate aggregate estimate than the estimates of single lay or expert decision-makers. This can be quantified by the "diversity prediction theorem" (9) , which states that the collective error is equal to the average individual error minus the group's diversity (Materials and Methods).
The wisdom of crowd effect is a statistical phenomenon and not a social psychological effect, because it is based on a mathematical aggregation of individual estimates. Nevertheless, social influence plays a role in individual decision-making and affects individual estimating. Therefore, social influence can also have an impact on the statistical aggregate and the resulting collective wisdom of the respective crowd. As social influence among human group members may trigger individuals to revise their estimates (10) , it can have a substantial impact on the statistical wisdom of crowd effect in societies. When individuals become aware of the estimates of others, they may revise their own estimates for various reasons: People may suspect that others have better information (11, 12) , they may partially follow the wisdom of the crowd (13) , there may be peer pressure toward conformity (14) (15) (16) (17) , or the group may engage in a process of deliberation about the facts. An example of deliberation about facts would be the task of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Although there is evidence from social psychology that humans have an inclination to adjust their opinions to those of others so that they gradually converge toward consensus (4, 18) , many existing studies have two drawbacks. First, consensus formation has often been investigated for questions for which there are no well defined correct answers. Typical examples are attitudes toward abortion, nuclear power, war on terror, or election polls. Another case are "cultural" markets of musical tastes, in which it has been demonstrated that almost any song of average quality may become a hit if social influence is introduced by publishing the number of downloads (19) . In this case, the popularity of a song and its perceived quality emerge through the process of interactive downloading and rating. The herding effects created in this way prevent an objective measurement of quality. Therefore, such settings do not reveal whether social influence works in favor or to the disadvantage of the wisdom of the group.
The second drawback of existing studies is that correct answers are often not rewarded with monetary incentives, which makes correct estimations less important and conformity costless. In contrast, we study the interconnection between social influence and the wisdom in groups by using factual questions and monetary incentives for good individual guesses. First, this allows disentanglement of social influence from the wisdom of the group. Second, the incentives trigger the ability to use information of others only for improving own estimates and not for aligning with others for the sake of conformity. This allows investigation of how social influence affects the group's wisdom.
In this article, we will demonstrate that social influence has three effects that can undermine the wisdom of crowds. Two of the effects are changes of statistical aggregates and one is psychological. The "social influence effect" describes the fact that social influence diminishes the diversity of the group without improvements in accuracy. The "range reduction effect" moves the position of the truth to peripheral regions. This corrupts the wisdom of the crowd from an observer's perspective in the sense that the group becomes less reliable in guiding decision-makers. The "confidence effect" boosts individuals' confidence. [A related effect is known as overconfidence (20) (21) (22) .] This boost in confidence subverts the wisdom of crowd effect psychologically, because individuals' perceptions contradict the aggregate outcomes of a lack of improvements in accuracy and a decreased reliability of the group's range of estimates.
Recent theoretical studies have analyzed the wisdom of crowd effect in the context of information diffusion in networks of simulated agents in which too little and too much dissemination of information inhibits actors to find optimal solutions, because there is a need to maintain diversity on the one hand and information flow on the other (23) . However, from an empirical point of view, it is not clear whether the reduction of diversity is strong enough to severely undermine the wisdom of crowd effect in reality. In the following, we demonstrate by means of laboratory experiments that the wisdom of crowd effect is undermined in all three of the aforementioned ways, even when social influence is relatively mild. Furthermore, the severity of statistical undermining is quantified by a new indicator, which measures the centrality of the truth within a given set of estimates.
Experimental Design
To identify how social influence affects the wisdom of crowds, we conducted a laboratory experiment with real monetary stakes. A total of 144 participants were recruited from a sample of more than 8000 students at Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich in Zurich, Switzerland. Twelve experimental sessions were conducted, each consisting of 12 subjects.
The participants had to solve six different estimation tasks testing their real-world knowledge regarding geographical facts and crime statistics. We selected questions for which subjects were unlikely to know the exact answer but also avoided those for which they did not have a clue at all. Each question was simultaneously presented to all subjects in a computer laboratory by using the z-tree software (24) . Each subject sat in an isolated cubicle in front of a computer with no visual, verbal, or chat contact with each other and was asked to enter the estimates privately without communicating with other subjects. All subjects were told all details of the experimental procedures and payments by printed instructions, which described the payment rules, the anonymity warranty, the obligation to adhere to the no-communication policy, and the obligation to make no use of any auxiliary devices such as the Internet or mobile phones. A test in the beginning ensured that subjects understood the payment rules.
In the first estimation period, all subjects had to respond to the first knowledge question on their own. After all 12 group members made an estimate, everybody was asked to give another estimate. In total, we elicited five consecutive responses for each knowledge question. Additionally, we elicited after the first and final estimate for each question subjects' confidence in their estimate on a six-point Likert scale (1, very uncertain; 6, very certain).
The confidence values were not communicated to others. After the fifth (and final) estimate of each question, an evaluation was provided that included the true answer, the five estimates of the respective subject, the payments for each of the five estimates, and the total payment for all estimates for one question.
We tested three different information conditions regarding what each subject learned about the estimates of the other subjects. Subjects could base their second, third, fourth, and fifth estimate on either aggregated or nonaggregated information regarding other people's estimates. Two of our conditions were different operationalizations of social influence, and the third condition served as a control condition without social influence. The reason to use two different kinds of social influence was to demonstrate the robustness of our effects with regard to the specific kind of social influence.
In the "aggregated information" condition, subjects could reconsider their estimate after having received the average (arithmetic mean) of all 12 estimates of the former round. Subjects were also reminded about their last estimate from the previous round. In the "full information" treatment, subjects received a figure of the trajectories of all subjects' estimates from all previous rounds. In this figure, the estimates of each of the 12 subjects over all previous rounds were represented by one line, adding up to 12 separate lines (one for each subject). In addition, the numerical values of all subjects' estimates from the last round were presented and subjects were reminded about their own last estimate.* The "no information" treatment served as a control and revealed no information about the other subjects' estimates. In this condition, subjects had to answer the same question five times on their own. They were reminded about their latest estimate.
In each session, two questions were posed in the control, two in the aggregated, and two in the full information treatment. The order of questions and the order of treatments was randomized across experimental sessions. This means that the same six knowledge questions were posed in each experimental session, but in a different order and in different information treatments. The allocation of subjects to a random sequence of questions and information treatments ruled out order effects with regard to questions and treatments.
Subjects received monetary payments for each good estimate. Possible rewards were 4, 2, or 1 points if their estimates fell into the 10%, 20%, or 40% intervals around the truth; otherwise, they received no points. The rewards applied to all rounds to make sure that individuals took all of their decisions seriously. The correct answer and the rewards for all five estimates were only disclosed to the subjects after the fifth estimate. This reward structure introduced incentives only to find the truth and avoided incentives to conform with others. Furthermore, there were no incentives for strategic considerations. For example, there was no benefit of being better than others or of misleading others, because this did not affect individuals' payments. There was also no possibility to help others by deviating from the strategy to find the best estimate. Therefore, our experimental design put subjects into a situation in which they would try to get as close to the truth as possible by using their own knowledge and the estimates of others.
Materials and Methods provides more in-depth information regarding the knowledge questions, payment rules, and data structure. SI Appendix contains all the details of the experimental procedures that were presented to the subjects. Dataset S1 contains the raw data.
Results
Aggregation of the Wisdom of Crowds. The empirical analysis of the wisdom of crowds requires an appropriate aggregation measure. [Already in reply to Galton's article (1), there was a discussion of how to find the best aggregation measure for the wisdom of crowds (25, 26) . It is common to use the unweighted *In real-life situations with social influence, there may be additional effects, from which our experiment has abstracted: this includes competition, group pressure, and authority effects. For example, a criminologist could say: "I know the number of victims." In contrast to such possibilities, our comparably mild and parsimonious kind of information feedback has the advantage that it enables a particularly controlled experimental setting in which there is little ambiguity about which kind of information feedback and social influence played a role. arithmetic mean, but there are many reasonable alternatives, giving ample room for adjustments or "tuning" (27) (28) (29) (30) .] In our case, the arithmetic mean performs poorly, as we have validated by comparing its distance to the truth with the individual distances to the truth. In only 21.3% of the cases is the arithmetic mean closer to the truth than the individual first estimates. This is because the estimates of our type of questions are not normally distributed but right-skewed. In other words, the majority of estimates are low and a minority of estimates are scattered in a fat right tail, as it is the case for log-normal distributions.
As a large number of our subjects had problems choosing the right order of magnitude of their responses, they faced a problem of logarithmic nature (31) . When using logarithms of estimates, the arithmetic mean is closer to the logarithm of the truth than the individuals' estimates in 77.1% of the cases. This confirms that the geometric mean (i.e., exponential of the mean of the logarithmized data) is an accurate measure of the wisdom of crowds for our data (Table 1 ). In particular, log-normal distributions are justified for variables with high variance with a range of positive values only (32) , which is the case for our data. † We further divided each estimate by the respective true value before taking the logarithm to make the distributions of estimates comparable across different questions. This yielded approximately normal distributions and true values corresponding to zero.
Social Influence Effect. The first kind of undermining of the wisdom of crowds is a statistical effect, which we call social influence effect. This effect denotes the fact that social influence diminishes diversity in groups without improving its accuracy. This means that, on average, groups cannot make use of information exchange, but engage in a convergence process that does not yield improvements of the collective. ‡ Fig. 1 gives evidence for the social influence effect. Here, group diversities and collective errors for each question and each time step are computed on the transformed data set. Fig. 1A shows for each information condition exemplary responses to one question over the five time steps in one group. By comparing the no information condition with the aggregated and full information conditions, the typical effects of social influence can clearly be seen. It is evident that social influence promotes a convergence of estimates. Fig. 1B shows, for the same exemplary sessions, core ranges of estimates and two types of aggregate measures: the arithmetic mean and the geometric mean. Fig. 1C provides the respective numbers for the exemplary sessions. We provide a test for the complete data in Fig. 1 D and E, demonstrating that social influence strongly reduces the group's diversity § without significantly reducing its collective errors. ¶ The robustness of the social influence effect is supported by further statistical significance tests (SI Appendix). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms that the distribution of estimates changes significantly if social influence is allowed for. This applies particularly to the variance of the distribution, as an F test shows. In addition, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and t tests for the group data demonstrate that the group diversity is significantly reduced under social influence, whereas the collective error changes only slightly. In the control condition without social influence, these effects are almost null.
Range Reduction Effect. Let us take the perspective of a person who, or government that, needs advice and requests expertise from different specialists. If all predictions are narrowly distributed around a wrong value, a decision-maker would gain confidence in advice that is actually misleading. In fact, the close clustering around a wrong value makes the group less "wise" in the sense that the group delivers a wrong hint regarding the location of the truth. This is the case because the truth would not be located centrally but at outer regions of the range of estimates. We quantify this by a wisdom-of-crowd indicator, which Table 1 . The wisdom of crowd effect exists with respect to the geometric mean but not with respect to the arithmetic mean
Question
True value
Wisdom-of-crowd aggregation
Median Arithmetic mean Geometric mean
The aggregate measures arithmetic mean, geometric mean, and median are computed on the set of all first estimates regardless of the information condition. Values in parentheses are deviations from the true value as percentages. † Note that the framework of the diversity prediction theorem (9) can also be applied to logarithmically transformed data. For the case of logarithmically transformed data, the collective error of the logarithms is the logarithm of the geometric mean and one SD is the logarithm of the geometric SD. Considering the logarithmic nature of our data, one may argue that the geometric mean would have been a better design choice than the arithmetic mean for the information feedback in the aggregated information condition. However, this measure is hard to understand for most subjects because it necessitates confidence with logarithmic transformations. As the simple average (i.e., arithmetic mean) is known from daily life, this information is more meaningful for subjects. Hence, we decided for the arithmetic mean. ‡ The empirical measurement of the social influence effect requires questions with moderate difficulty. In particular, subjects should not have a precise factual knowledge of an issue, because this would prevent adaption and social influence. We can empirically confirm that this was not the case for our questions and subjects: in only 1.5% of all cases, subjects responded at all five times in the most inner payment range of one particular question. This means in absolute values that 13 of 864 consecutive response runs were responded in the full payment range (144 subjects responded to six questions in a run of five consecutive responses). Three of these 13 "high-success runs" were performed by the same person and two from another person. All other high-success runs were performed by different persons. § It deserves to be mentioned that the initial diversity seems to be higher in the no information condition. It could be that subjects anticipate to feel uneasy if their published estimates are too distant from those of others. This could foster that their initial estimates tend to be more "conservative" in the conditions with information feedback. Interestingly, this discrepancy in initial variance is mainly caused by the questions about crime statistics and not about geographical facts. ¶ Note that the collective error slightly declines under social influence, especially in the aggregated information condition, which is partially supported by the significance tests (SI Appendix). This is a result of two empirical facts. First, the distributions of estimates are right-skewed. As a consequence, the arithmetic mean is usually much larger than most estimates and also much larger than the true value. Second, it is an empirical fact for our choice of questions that the geometric mean (which is our aggregation measure to compute the collective error) is always slightly lower than the true value ( Table 1 ). The mechanism of presenting the arithmetic mean in the aggregated condition thus triggers an upward drift toward the true value. This issue is interesting but deserves future studies, as this effect may be different for different sets of questions.
generalizes the concept of "bracketing the truth" (33) to more than two persons. Our indicator considers a group to be maximally wise if the truth lies between the two most central values of all estimates (in our case, between the sixth and the seventh largest of 12 estimates). If the four most central values are needed to enclose the true value, the level of wisdom is considered to be lower, and if the six most central values are needed, it is even lower, and so forth. If it lies outside the range of estimates of all individuals, there is no wisdom of crowd effect at all (a precise definition is provided in Methods and Materials). Fig. 2A shows bar plots of the wisdom-of-crowd indicator over time for the three treatments for the same exemplary question as in Fig. 1 . Furthermore, the corresponding core range of sorted estimates enclosing the true value is reported. The figure demonstrates that the wisdom-of-crowd indicator tends to decline over time under conditions of social influence. This effect is substantial and statistically significant for all questions, which is confirmed by the regression model in Fig. 2B . It is revealed that the wisdom of crowd indicator is about one unit lower in conditions with information exchange compared with the control condition. Note that the reduction is stronger under the aggre- The predictors in both models are the experimental treatments, implemented as dummy variables and coded with 1 as the experimental condition (aggregated or full information) and 0 otherwise. The control condition is the reference category, represented by the intercept of the respective regression model. In model 1, the wisdom-of-crowd indicator is calculated for the pooled second, third, fourth, and fifth time step. The first time step is excluded because the initial period had no information feedback and can therefore not yield treatment differences. In model 2, individuals' increase in confidence is the outcome variable, which is the difference between the initial and final individuals' certainty in their estimates. Robust SEs are calculated, taking the clustering within subjects into account. gated information condition compared with the "full information condition. [This matches previous findings on the effects of social influence in terms of gossip on the behavior, which seems to be stronger if gossip comes from fewer sources (34) .] An increase of one unit means that one has to consider one additional person in the upper range and one additional person in the lower range of sorted estimates so that the truth is included in the selected range. This effect demonstrates that the truth becomes less central if social influence is allowed for. Another interpretation of this effect is that the group becomes less reliable in estimating the truth if it has been exposed to social influence.
Confidence Effect. The third kind of undermining of the wisdom of crowds concerns the psychological consequences of the two aforementioned statistical effects. The confidence effect reflects that opinion convergence boosts individuals' confidence in their estimates despite a lack of collective improvements in accuracy. Fig. 2A shows the individuals' self-reported change in confidence regarding their initial and final estimates for the same exemplary sessions as studied before. It can be seen that individuals in these exemplary sessions become more confident in the full information condition and less confident in the control condition. We analyze the general effects over all sessions and questions with regression models in Fig. 2B . This regression analysis demonstrates that individuals' confidence is substantially and significantly boosted in the aggregated and full information conditions in comparison with the control condition without social influence. We can interpret this psychological effect in comparison with the statistical effects: the confidence measure can be regarded as "subjective"-and self-reported reliability of estimates and the wisdom of crowd indicator as "objective"-statistical measure of reliability. The comparison of both illustrates that social influence undermines the wisdom of crowds by boosting the subjective and decreasing the objective reliability of the crowd.
Discussion
Based on the wisdom of crowd effect, groups can be remarkably accurate in estimating vaguely known facts. From the perspective of decision-makers, it would be valuable to request multiple independent opinions and aggregate these as the basis of their judgements. Real-life examples are predictions of economic growth rates, market potentials, the increase of the world temperature, tax estimations, the assessment of the impact of new technologies, or estimating the amount of finite natural resources. However, it is hardly feasible to receive independent opinions in society, because people are embedded in social networks and typically influence each other to a certain extent. It is remarkable how little social influence is required to produce herding behavior and negative side effects for the mechanism underlying the wisdom of crowds. In our experiment, we provided just the bare information of the estimates of others (in a similar way as the previous stock price is known to traders trying to make money with their estimates of the fundamental value of a stock). We did not allow for group leader effects, persuasion, or any other kind of social psychological influence. We just provided noncompetitive monetary incentives for the estimation of correct values. These incentives were designed such that the information of others could just be used to update the own knowledge. There was no premium to coordinate with others' opinions.
Our experimental results show that social influence triggers the convergence of individual estimates and substantially reduces the diversity of the group without improving its accuracy. The remaining diversity is often so small that the correct value shifts from the center to outer regions of the range of estimates. Thus, when taking committee decisions or following the advise of an expert group that was exposed to social influence, their opinions may result in a set of predictions that does not even enclose the correct value anymore. From the perspective of decision-makers, such advice may be thoroughly misleading, because closely related, seemingly independent advice may pretend certainty despite substantial deviations from the correct solution.
Psychologically, however, the convergence of estimates significantly boosts individuals' confidence. This confidence gain happens despite a lack of improvements, giving evidence for a psychological trap whereby individuals are led into the false belief of collective accuracy as a result of their convergence. Nevertheless, the statistical effects of undermining are less severe for easier questions and if individuals are more confident in their answers (SI Appendix). This gives weight to the conclusion that the negative effects of social influence occur especially in a certain range of question difficulty and individuals' confidence, a conjecture that should be explored in follow-up studies.
Our results underpin the value of collecting individuals' estimates in the absence of social influence. However, in democratic societies, it is difficult to accomplish such a collection of independent estimates, because the loss of diversity in estimates appears to be a necessary byproduct of transparent decision-making processes. For example, opinion polls and the mass media largely promote information feedback and therefore trigger convergence of how we judge the facts. The wisdom of crowd effect is valuable for society, but using it multiple times creates collective overconfidence in possibly false beliefs.
Presumably, herding is even more pronounced for opinions or attitudes for which no predefined correct answers exist. For example, prospective research may investigate herding and consensus formation on predictions of climate change or election outcomes. However, long-term predictions may have short-term consequences on the system itself: pessimistic predictions for climate change may entail international political consequences, or election polls may change the popularity of parties that have been exposed as those with the least support. These feedback loops hinder the disentanglement of herding behavior from the wisdom of crowds.
Materials and Methods
Knowledge Questions, Payment Rules, and Data Structure. The following questions were used:
What is the population density in Switzerland in inhabitants per
square kilometer? 2. What is the length of the border between Switzerland and Italy in kilometers? 3. How many more inhabitants did Zurich gain in 2006? 4. How many murders were officially registered in Switzerland in 2006? 5. How many rapes were officially registered in Switzerland in 2006? 6. How many assaults were officially registered in Switzerland in 2006?
All questions imply nonnegative or positive numbers as answers. Note that question 3 may have also allowed a negative gain of inhabitants, but the question was phrased such that it implied a gain and not a loss. Furthermore, entering negative numbers was not supported by our program.
Subjects received monetary payments in Swiss Francs (CHF) for each good estimate, taking the distance between the estimate and the true value into account. Three different intervals for monetary payments were used: 0% to 10% deviation (1.40 CHF), 11% to 20% deviation (0.70 CHF), and 21% to 40% deviation (0.35 CHF). Estimates that were more than 40% away from the true value were not financially rewarded. Rewards were communicated in experimental points and paid in CHF without requiring a signature after the experiment.
Our data (Dataset S1) comprise 12 groups in which 12 subjects responded five times to six knowledge questions in separate cubicles. Two questions were posed in the control, two in the aggregated, and two in the full information treatment. Thus, for each treatment, we had 24 groups: four groups for each of the six questions. The order of the questions and treatments was randomized among the experimental sessions.
Ten values were removed from the statistical analysis of the data set. Five of them were dramatic outliers from the same person in the same run. They were 1,000 times larger than the second largest estimate; thus, the subject seemed to have confused meters and kilometers. Four estimates were detected as "fun moves." The "fun" under the aggregate information condition was to make an incredibly large estimate to test how much the mean of the group would increase. Analogously, under the full information condition, the fun was to make incredibly high guesses to produce steep lines. The latter fun moves did not affect the rest of the information because there was always also a list of estimates from the previous round. One zero estimate was removed only when logarithmic data were used for computational reasons.
Measures. For a set of estimates x 1 , . . ., x n and the true value, we took the following measures to quantify the impact of social influence on the wisdom of crowds effect: The mean is denoted by 
The proof is elementary. The collective error is also called "population bias" (6) . A low collective error combined with a high group diversity implies that the wisdom of crowd effect works well, because asking many instead of one drastically improves accuracy. Both measures are used in Fig. 1 D and E. Notice that x i ¼ logðx i =truthÞ are log-arithms of the raw data pointx i normalized by the corresponding true values. The arithmetic mean of these logarithms corresponds to the geometric mean. Logarithms transform the results from arithmetic mean to geometric means, where a wisdom of crowd effect exists. Normalization of raw estimates by the truth makes different questions comparable. For the definition of the wisdom-of-crowd indicator (Fig. 2) let b x 1 ; . . . ; b x n be the sorted estimates. Then, the wisdom of crowd indicator is maxfijb x i ≤ truth ≤ b x n − iþ1 g. The wisdom-of-crowd indicator achieves its maximum at [n / 2] when the truth lies between the most central estimates (or at the most central estimate). Its minimum of zero is achieved when the truth lies below the minimal or above the maximal estimate. Notice, that a high wisdom-of-crowd indicator implies that the truth is close to the median. Thus, it implicitly defines the median as the appropriate measure of aggregation. In our empirical case this is not in conflict with the choice of the geometric mean as can be seen by the similarity of the geometric mean and the median in Table 1 . A theoretical reason is that the geometric mean and the median coincide for a log-normal distribution. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for differences in the distributions over time (untransformed estimates). Let us consider the 144 initial estimates (regardless of the information treatment) of all subjects for question Q as sample 1 and the 48 estimates at time step T under a certain information condition as sample 2. Table 1 reports the p-values of two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests. The tests show that the Null hypothesis (the two samples come from the same distribution) can usually not be rejected for the "no information" treatment. In contrast, the Null hypothesis can usually be rejected for the "aggregated" and "full information" condition. This confirms that social influence changes the distributions of estimates significantly, while responding multiple times to the same question without social influence does not.
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F-Tests for differences in variances over time (normalized logarithmized estimates). We performed F -Tests on the logarithms of the estimates divided by the corresponding true values (cf. "Materials and Methods" in the main paper). Let us consider the 48 initial estimates of all subjects for question Q and the specific information treatment at time step T = 1 as sample 1. Sample 2 consists of the 48 estimates at time step T = 2, 3, 4, 5. Table 2 reports the p-values of two-sample F -Tests. The tests confirm that the Null hypothesis (the two samples belong to normal distributions with the same variance) can usually not be rejected under the "no information" condition. In contrast, the Null hypothesis can be rejected for the "aggregated information" and the "full information" condition. This confirms that social influence significantly reduces the group's diversity (as seen in Figure 1D in the main paper). Note that the results should be taken with care because distributions can not always be regarded as normal.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests and t-Tests on the group level (normalized logarithmized estimates).The tests described here have been performed on the logarithms of estimates divided by the true value (see "Materials and Methods" in the main paper). Recall that the collective error of a group at time T is the square of the distance of the arithmetic mean of the twelve transformed estimates and the true value. The group diversity is the variance of these twelve estimates. For each information condition we have 24 groups (six questions answered by four groups each). Let us consider the 24 collective errors (group diversities) at time T = 1 as sample 1 and the 24 collective errors (group diversities) at times T = 2, 3, 4, 5 as sample 2. Table 3 reports the p-values of two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests and two sample righttailed t-Tests.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests demonstrate that the Null hypothesis (the group diversity and the collective error come from the same distribution for consecutive time steps) can not be rejected under the 'no information' condition. In contrast, the Null hypothesis for group diversity can mostly be rejected for the aggregated and full information condition. The results for the collective error are less significant. In the aggregated information condition, the Null hypothesis can mostly be rejected; however, in the full information condition, it can not.
The t-Tests evaluate the Null hypothesis that both distributions have the same mean. The alternative hypothesis states that the mean of sample 2 is lower. The results for the t-Test confirm the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests; however, have to be taken with some care due to the nonnormality of our data. 1 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 2 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 3 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 4 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 5 0.04* 0.14 0.00* 0.00* 6 0.03* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* full information Q T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 T = 5 1 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 2 0.01* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 3 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 4 0.01* 0.06 0.00* 0.00* 5 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.07 6 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* How question difficulty moderates the undermining effects of social influence. A plausible conjecture is that the undermining effects of social influence are moderated by the difficulty of the question. People may be less socially influenced for easier questions. In our terminology, this would mean that the Social Influence Effect and the Range Reduction Effect would be smaller for easier questions. The measurement of question difficulty raises the problem to measure difficulty separately from accuracy. Often, accuracy is actually used as a measure of difficulty by defining difficulty as the proportion of correct answers [1] . However, we are interested in the empirical correlation between difficulty and accuracy, as our definition of undermining relates to accuracy in terms of the collective error. This is why we need a measure of difficulty which is independent from accuracy. This can only be accomplished by using auxiliary assumptions: "The only way to capitalize on the relationship between item difficulty and type of miscalibration seems to be to assume something about the difficulty of the items in the world in which our judge is functioning." [1] Our solution is an indirect measure of difficulty by using the average confidence over all individuals, which can be regarded as a subjective measure of perceived difficulty. More specifically, we computed the new variable average perceived easiness by using the measure of self-reported confidence in the initial estimate. Recall that individuals' confidence ranges from 1 (=very uncertain) to 6 (=very certain) and was asked after the first and final estimate. We define the average perceived easiness of a question as the average initial individual confidence over all initial estimates for a particular question. The following list shows questions ranked by difficulty with easiness values in brackets: We use the values of perceived question easiness to perform two regression analyses, cf. Table 4 . These regressions estimate whether the effects of social influence on group diversity and the wisdom of crowd indicator are lower for easier questions. Regression model (1) in Table 4 specifies group diversity as dependent variable and as independent variables the aggregated and the full information treatments as dummy variables, question easiness and the interactions between both treatments and easiness. Regression model (2) specifies the same independent variables and uses as dependent variable the wisdom of crowd indicator. The clustered data structure is taken into account by multilevel models. Note, that we do not extend our analysis to the Confidence Effect because we use the confidence measure as an indirect measure of question easiness. In order to avoid circular reasoning and spurious correlations, we base the analysis only on the two statistical effects: Social Influence Effect and Range Reduction Effect. We illustrate the regression results in Figure 1 . The differences between the no information and the aggregated information treatment with respect to the dependent variable are plotted as a red line; the difference of the no information and full information treatment as blue line. The lines are computed from the estimated effects from the regression models in Table 4 . Figure 1A demonstrates that the effect of social influence on group diversity is smaller for easier questions and Figure 1B that this holds for the wisdom of crowd indicator as well.
Tab. 4 Linear random intercepts models of group diversity and the wisdom of crowd indicator. All regressions are comprised of 288 groups, which consist of twelve independent groups, which gave four answers to six questions. The first time step is excluded because the initial period happens before information feedback was provided and therefore cannot generate treatment differences. The remaining four time steps are pooled. Because answers from the same groups have a smaller variance than those from different groups, this clustering is taken into account by random intercepts models. The standard deviation of intercepts is calculated by clustering 72 different time series (twelve groups responding to six different questions). The predictors of models (1) and (2) are the experimental treatments, implemented as dummy variables and coded with 1 as the experimental condition (aggregated or full information) and 0 otherwise. The control condition is the reference category, represented by the intercept of the respective regression model. Furthermore, question easiness is included and respective interaction effects with the treatment variables. The interaction effects are graphically illustrated in Figure 4 .
(1) Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001
The regression model (1) in Table 4 shows that the interaction effects for the Social Influence Effect are statistically significant. The regression models for the Range Reduction Effect are not statistically significant, however, point in the same direction. The effects can be interpreted such that the Social Influence Effect and the Range Reduction Effect become smaller, the easier the question. In other words: The wisdom of crowd is more undermined by social influence when questions are more difficult. Table 4 . The red line depicts the differences between the no information and the aggregated information treatment and the blue line the differences between the no information and the full information treatment. (A) The Social Influence Effect is smaller for easier questions, because the differences between the control and the social influence treatments with respect to group diversity become smaller for easier questions. (B) The Range Reduction Effect is smaller for easier questions, because the differences between the control and the social influence treatments with respect to the wisdom of crowd indicator become smaller for easier questions. uals are more confident in their answers. The x-axis denotes the initial confidence of subjects in their first estimate from 1 (very unconfident) to 6 (very confident). The y-axis denotes the differences between the no information and the social influence treatments (aggregated and full information) with respect to (A) group diversity and (B) collective error. The data refers to group diversities and collective errors of estimates 2 to 5 of all individuals with the same confidence (four estimates from each subject). The table shows the number of subjects in each confidence group for all three treatments (each person appears six times as a subject). (A) Higher confidence of individuals causes a smaller reduction of group diversity for social influence conditions compared to the control condition. For individuals who perceive a question as easier (high confidence) social influence undermines the wisdom of crowd effect less because diversity is less reduced. (B) Higher confidence has no systematic effect on the collective error. Note that grouping is across groups of social influence and across different questions. Computation is on estimates normalized by the respective true value and logarithmized such that the wisdom of crowd effect is comparable across questions and treatments.
We can confirm the reduced Social Influence Effect for easier questions by another analysis on the individual level. We regroup the responses of subjects by the information condition under which they were elicited and by the initial confidence of the subject regarding its estimate for each question. For each information condition we gain six new groups ranging from the group of very unconfident subjects to the group of very confident subjects. The number of subjects in each group is reported in the table in Figure 2 . Note that N in the table refers to the number of experimental runs of each subject, i.e. each person completed one run for each question with a total of six runs. We pooled for all new groups the (normalized and logarithmized) estimates of rounds 2 to 5 and computed the group diversity and the collective error on the collections of these estimates. Thus, group diversities and collective errors in the new groups are computed for much larger groups than in the groups which actually played together. Further on, estimates regrading different questions are grouped together. This makes sense because of the division of estimates by the corresponding true values in the normalized sample. Figure  2A shows for group diversity the differences between the no information treatment minus the aggregated respectively full information treatment. Figure 2B shows the same differences for the collective error. It is evident that the decline of group diversity due to social influence is much larger for less confident persons. There is almost no effect on the collective error. This shows that stronger individual confidence buffers undermining in the sense of the Social Influence Effect.
Documentation of the experimental design Introduction
This documentation illustrates the details of the experimental design with which the data was collected. The following pages contain:
1. Written Instructions. These paper instructions were provided in the cubicles in which subjects performed the experiment in isolation under anonymous conditions. The instructions were distributed before the experiment started. Instructions are translated to English. The original instruction were in German. 2. Screen Translations. English translations of the five main screens of the computer experiment.
• "No information" treatment • "Aggregated information" treatment • "Full information" treatment • Measures of subjects' confidence in their estimates • Payment information 3. Full Time Line of Screens. All 69 screens of one session in the order presented to subjects.
Session Plan. Question were randomized over the three experimental conditions ("no information", "aggregated information", "full information") as indicated in the table below. Each row represents the order of questions in one of the twelve sessions. As we regarded the randomization of questions as more important than randomizing experimental conditions, the experimental conditions were always in the order of no, aggregated and full information with two questions each. This order made it also better comprehensible for subjects to follow the experiment, as the extent of information feedback increased from the no, to aggregated to full information. 
STUDY "KNOWING, GUESSING AND ESTIMATING IN GROUPS"

Basic idea
This experiment is about the estimation of factual numbers. Depending on the quality of your estimates, you will receive points, which will be transferred to Swiss Francs at the end. The following applies: 
Information about the estimates of your fellow players
After your first estimate, you are asked to give four further estimates to the same question. Depending on the current stage of the game, you will receive no information, the average or extensive graphical and numerical information of all 12 estimates of you fellow players for your next estimate for the same question.
Calculation of profits
You can make profit in every estimation period. You will receive your total profit at the end. The calculation of profits is based on the distance of the estimates to the true value -the closer you are to the true value, the more money you will earn. (The distance is calculated as the absolute value of the truth minus your estimate.) You profit only depends on your own estimates. The backside reports the exact calculation of profits as reference. The calculation of profits will also be displayed during the experiment, so that it is sufficient to look up the precise calculations at the backside only in case of lack of clarity.
Please keep in mind:
If you try to get at the requested information by illegitimate means as the usage of internet or mobile phones, you will be excluded from the study.
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The exact calculation of profits from the true value for knowledge questions, deviation of 3 or more for group assessment questions)
Screen Translation: "No information" treatment
Knowledge Question: What is the length of the border between Switzerland and Italy in kilometers?
Game Rules
Individual Profit (1) You win in every round when your estimate is close to the true value.
(2) The estimates of the other players are only for your information and do not affect your profit. The exact computation of your profit is described in the Instructions. Find the current game parameters to the right. Information about the estimates of others: none Game Parameters 12 players, 5 rounds The true value is larger than 0. Distance to the true value Distance 0%-10% >>> Profit 4 Distance 11%-20% >>> Profit 2 Distance 21%-40% >>> Profit 1
Your 4th estimate please (your former estimate was 500) Please estimate once again.
Screen Translation: "Mean information" treatment
Knowledge Question: How many assaults were officially registered in Switzerland in 2006?
Game Rules
(2) The estimates of the other players are only for your information and do not affect your profit. The exact computation of your win is described in the Instructions. Find the current game parameters to the right. Information about the estimates of others: mean value of the former round Game Parameters 12 players, 5 rounds The true value is larger than 0. Distance to the true value Distance 0%-10% >>> Profit 4 Distance 11%-20% >>> Profit 2 Distance 21%-40% >>> Profit 1
Your 4th estimate please (your former estimate was 500) The mean value of the 12 estimates of all subjects from the last runde is 10250.0 (The mean value is the sum of all estimates divided by the number of estimates.)
Screen Translation: "Full information" treatment
Knowledge Question: What is the population density in Switzerland in inhabitants per square kilometer Game Rules Individual Profit (1) You win in every round when your estimate is close to the true value.
(2) The estimates of the other players are only for your information and do not affect your profit. The exact computation of your win is described in the Instructions. Find the current game parameters to the right. Information about the estimates of others: graphically and numerically 
